![TraceRoutine (1, “The MMIO base address is exx08x.”, <em>((unsigned int</em>)a1 + 12));
_LABEL_7:
_mm_1fence();
PVAMapping = MmMapIoSpaceEx(a1[6], <em>((unsigned int</em>)a1 + 14), 4164);// PAGE_READWRITE
a1[8] = pVAMapping;
if (!pVAMapping )
return exc000009A164;
__mm_1fence();
CACHE_VA_REGION (PVAMapping);
v17[0] = 0;
v19 = 0164;
// STATUS_INSUFFICENT_RESOURCES
// Store Mapped MMIO Region VA in Global
TraceRoutine_0(&v19, “IISPHWConfigManager::Dereference”);
if (_InterlockedExchangeAdd((volatile signed __int32 *)a1 + 10, 0xFFFFFFFF) == 1)](https://i0.wp.com/owasp.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Exploring-a-New-Class-of-Kernel-Exploit-Primitive-MSRC.png?resize=360%2C181&ssl=1)
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Exploring a New Class of Kernel Exploit Primitive | MSRC Blog
Exploring a New Class of Kernel Exploit Primitive | MSRC Blog The security landscape is dynamic, changing often and as a result, attack surfaces evolve. MSRC receives a wide variety of cases spanning different products, bug types and exploit primitives. One particularly interesting primitive we see is an arbitrary kernel Read more…